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2Abstract 
 
In an era of fiscal stress for many local governments in the United States, 
intergovernmental cooperation has become a focus for cost savings.  Cooperation and 
consolidation is a recognition that existing boundaries and service delivery mechanism 
simply are too inefficient and burdensome for a community to maintain.  City and county 
officials face a basic tradeoff in assessing the merits of cooperation involving the desire 
of many citizens for sovereignty and local decision making authority versus the potential 
cost savings associated with the economies of scale of larger government units.  As 
intergovernmental agreements are negotiated, the issue of cost allocation among various 
parties often becomes a major issue.  Some cost allocation formulas emphasize ease of 
implementation, while potentially shifting the burden onto one or another party.  
Complicated cost allocation formulas may reduce burden sharing or donor situations, but 
at greater cost of implementation and maintenance.  A simple economic model is 
presented in this analysis to highlight the distributional consequences of various cost 
allocation strategies among parties to intergovernmental agreements.   
 
3I. Introduction 
Local governments in the United States, which includes townships, cities, 
counties and other special districts, have been forced over the past few decades to rethink 
their service provision of local public goods such as fire and police projection, solid 
waste management and back office operations.  Collaboration amongst local governments 
has become part of the strategy to achieve financial efficiency and quality service 
delivery.  This continuum of collaboration may include informal handshake agreements, 
buy-sell contracts, administrative boards, authorities and outright political consolidation.   
Intergovernmental or interlocal contracts have become a common tool for local 
governments to achieve economically and financially efficient methods for service 
delivery.  Fiscal stress in urban areas, changing population density and land use, changes 
in state laws and other factors have spurred the use of interlocal bargaining or 
contracting.  These contracts represent functional consolidation as opposed to political 
consolidation.  In almost all cases, individual jurisdictions retain ownership of assets and 
the responsibility for funding their share of the costs of the service provision.  As part of 
the contract negotiations, the local governments must decide on factors such as financing, 
management and administration and cost allocation. 
These cost allocation decisions are often part of the crux of the negotiations 
between governmental units.  In essence, the question boils down to “how is the bill 
going to be split”? In some cases, such as water and sewer, an easily identifiable user 
allows local governments to split the bill based on usage.  However, for many services 
such as fire and police protection, such easily identified measures do not exist.  
2Therefore, some formula must be used to split the bill.  Factors such as property values, 
population, usage (fire runs, crime rate) or others have all been used in practice. 
The choice of factors where the end user is difficult to identify has important 
distributional consequences regarding how the net benefits (benefits minus costs) will be 
allocated across parties.  For example, a factor such as property value may be easy to 
define and use but may have important distributional consequences for local governments 
and their citizens.  Under such a system, the major user of the service may not be the 
major payer of the service.  In some cases that may be acceptable, but in other cases that 
type of outcome may harm negotiations and lead to a breakdown in cooperation.  Often, 
negotiators vie for an easy to use system, such as population or property value, without 
considering the distributional consequences on the local government units.  While the 
transaction costs of data collection and monitoring must be considered, very little 
analysis has been provided on the economic consequences of alternative cost allocation 
schemes. 
 The focus of this analysis is on the challenge of constructing the cost allocation 
mechanisms as part of the general negotiation required to secure an intergovernmental 
agreement.  A general welfare economic model will be presented that highlights the 
issues facing local governments as they attempt to determine the impact of various cost 
allocation formulas.  For analytical purposes, three cost allocation schemes will be 
compared: (1) equal proportion cost sharing regardless of usage, (2) equal proportion cost 
sharing with flexible service provision and (3) usage or marginal cost sharing.  The 
economic impact of three generic cost allocation strategies will be compared for two 
representative local government units. 
3II. Literature Review 
There has been limited research on the role of interlocal or intergovernmental 
agreements in the popular and academic literature, although it is beginning to grow in the 
legal, political science and economics fields.  The U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Affairs in a much cited set of studies in the early 1960’s, 1970’s and 
1980’s surveyed local jurisdictions on their use of interlocal agreements (ACIR, 1985).  
They found there was use of such agreements to provide services as up to 50% of local 
jurisdictions used such devices.  Further, almost all states had provided legal authority for 
local jurisdictions to enter into intergovernmental contracts as of 1985.  
The most frequently cited reason for intergovernmental contracting was 
“economies of scale” and “cost savings” (ACIR, 1993).  The major limitation cited on 
intergovernmental agreements was the issue of the “loss of local autonomy”.  These 
characteristics provide bookends for framing the discussion presented in this analysis. 
 Beyond the ACRI, researchers have analyzed other rationales behind interlocal 
contracting.  These reasons include cost savings (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991; Stein, 
1990, Soneblum et al., 1977), regional coordination among various parties (Savitch and 
Vogel, 2000) and the establishment and long term stability of relationships among 
various local government entities (Wood, 2004; Thurmaier and Wood, 2002).   
Besides the rationale for interlocal contracting, researchers have examined the 
factors influencing the likelihood of intergovernmental cooperation.  The most cited 
factor regarding the likelihood of cooperation is the general area of transaction costs.  
These costs are the “friction” that prevent or inhibit parties from coming to potentially 
mutual beneficial agreements (North, 1990).  Transaction costs take several forms such as 
4measurement costs (Is the service identifiable and measurable?), enforcement (ease of 
ensuring that activities are actually undertaken) and negotiation and bargaining (upfront 
cost of coming to an agreement).  Of course, transaction costs are influenced by the 
number of participants and the degree of heterogeneity of the citizens of the involved in 
the bargaining process.  Finally, the presence of asset specificity is likely to lead to 
greater transaction costs in bargaining as the risk of exposure to the collapse of agreement 
for each party increases.  Asset specificity has been found to be a factor in the decision 
making process of public sector managers (Brown and Potoski, 2003). 
There are various structural factors, besides transaction costs, that may make it 
more or less likely that such cooperative behavior will be observed.  In one case, the 
presence of professional administrators versus part time elected officials will increase the 
likelihood of cooperation.  Both political culture and demographics share the demand and 
use of services by communities (Visser, 2002; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991).  Widely 
divergent communities may find it far more difficult to cooperate.  Another factor that 
affects the likelihood of interlocal contracting is the institutional or government rules that 
constrain or promote these types of activities (Ferris, 1986). 
The literature has explored the questions of the rationale behind 
intergovernmental cooperative ventures and the factors that make it more or less likely to 
be undertaken.  One aspect of this issue that has not been explored is the issue of cost 
allocation strategies and the impact of such strategies on the welfare of the respective 
cooperating government entities.  Any intergovernmental contract situation must 
determine a formula or method for splitting the cost amongst the parties.  In a simplified 
manner, the basic cost allocation strategies may include a fixed share for each party, 
5marginal cost pricing or even cross party subsidies.  This research is aimed at exploring 
the social welfare implications of cost allocation strategies that may be utilized in an 
intergovernmental contract setting. 
 
II. Conceptual Framework 
 A model originally conceived of by (Barzel (1971), Tullock (1969) and Buchanan 
(1971, 1973) provides a useful framework for conceptualize the decision calculus and 
outcomes associated with intergovernmental decisions.  A simple economic model will 
be presented to highlight the main features that will provide some guidance on the 
welfare impact of various cost allocation strategies underlying decisions to cooperate 
among local governmental units.  Using this framework, the key variables that would 
potentially determine the welfare implications can be demonstrated. 
 Imagine there are two local government units who are geographically contiguous 
and all are currently performing a typical set of local public services such as police and 
fire protection, solid waste pickup and removal, water and sewer system service, parks 
and recreation  and general government administration.  At some point, perhaps a 
downturn in the local economy, local leaders begin communicating about the possibility 
of joining services.  A model is needed to predict the total benefits and costs of such a 
cooperative venture and the impact of alternative cost sharing arrangements.   
 Based on this depiction, one critical variable is the inherent differences between 
communities in terms of service preferences and the associated elasticities.  As confirmed 
by more recent research forays (e.g. Alesina and Spolare, 2004), community preferences 
for public goods or services play a major role in the tradeoffs community’s must consider 
6in joining with their neighbors.  These differences that may be correlated with income, 
race, educational attainment or other factors, determine to what extent a community is 
willing to give up the sovereignty of decision making authority in regards to achieving 
economies of scale and cost savings. 
Using a model first developed by James Buchanan (1970, 1971), a conceptual 
framework will be presented to explain the forces influencing intergovernmental 
cooperation.   Figure one (depicted on the following page) represents the basic model as 
represented in Buchanan (1971).  The graph contains two linear demand functions for 
community X and community Y1. These demand functions represent the two 
communities and their respective local governments involved in service delivery.   
 
Basic Model 
The two hypothetical governments could represent townships, cities, counties or 
even special district governments.   The differences in the demand functions reflect the 
differences in community preferences for the public service under discussion2. The 
farther away these demand functions are from one another, the greater the differences in 
income become the two hypothetical communities.  Differences in regional wealth have 
been noted as one factor that leads to difficulties or challenges in cooperation (Gerber and 
Gibson, 2005).  It should be noted that as these income differentials widen, it becomes 
more difficult and a greater burden is placed on achieving economies of scale and cost 
savings to offset these income differentials. 
 
1 These community demand functions represent the aggregated preferences of citizens with a given 
community.  The community demand functions are compensated or Hicksian demand functions and are 
summed vertically (as described in the classic Samuelson article) for the joint provision demand function 
2 For the differences in demand functions to represent income differentials only, the assumption is made 
that the community’s underlying preference or utility functions are identical 
7Figure 1: Provision of Public Goods among Local Governments 
 
The community demand functions are intersected by price lines (P) and (2P).  
These price lines represent the price of providing a particular good or service under 
examination such as police, fire, water or recreation and parks.  When the price line 
intersect the community demand curve for the public good from community X, the 
optimal point of independent provision for that community is established (Qx)3. The 
 
3 The quantity axis is interpreted differently than a normal supply-demand curve.  The quantity axis 
represents a bundle of two units of a divisble “public good”.  Each community’s demand curve is 
interpreted as how much they value their share of the two unit bundle.  In this case, the assumption is made 
that each community receives a uniform provision of one unit each of the public good.  This 
“constitutional” assumption is necessary to derive a community demand function.  Note that the two 
community’s place different values (thus different slopes to the demand curve) on their respective one unit 
share of the public good. 
 
8same situation holds true of community Y, except due to their higher demand for the 
public good, the optimal point lies at Qy.
For this analysis, the price line is flat indicating a price taker model and there is a 
constant marginal cost.  For most local governments, prices of labor and materials are 
generally fixed in the marketplace and therefore this is a fairly reasonable assumption.  
Another assumption in this graphical framework is that the marginal cost of service 
provision is similar for both communities.  This is a more problematic assumption as 
larger communities may have lower costs due to differences in spreading out fixed costs. 
 The upper price line (2P) indicates the total combined cost of both communities 
of providing the service.  It represents the cost that would be applicable if the 
communities created an intergovernmental agreement and provided the service jointly.  In 
figure one, there are no cost savings to joint provisions and the joint cost curve is simply 
twice as high as the individual cost curve.  Under these conditions, the communities wish 
for different quantities of the good, such as different numbers of fire trucks or different 
amounts of police patrols and there would be no benefits or cost savings due to joint 
provision. 
The third or uppermost demand function (Dsum) is a vertical summation of the 
community demand curves representing total joint demand.  This total demand curve can 
be used to assess the efficiency of joint versus self provision for local units of 
government.  The total demand curve starts at the point where the lowest community 
demand curve is zero at the junction of the highest demand curve.  It then slopes upward 
toward the vertical axis.  The intersection of the community and total price lines with the 
total demand curve represents the point where marginal social cost equals marginal social 
9benefits.  However, even those these points are equal, the distribution of costs and 
benefits across communities may vary widely. 
A point must be made requiring the quantity provided to different participants in a 
joint provision of service agreement and the impact of who receives what level of service 
or quantity of the public good.   In the standard public good model, the quantity produced 
is available to all participants because of the nature or technology of the good prevents 
any individual from being excluded from consumption (i.e. clean air or national defense) 
(Samuelson, 1954).  The model presented in this analysis presumes, due to a political 
decision rather than a technological one that the good produced is available to all 
residents or participants within the local government jurisdictions.  This factor then leads 
to the result that the community demand or marginal evaluation curves can be 
constructed on the notion that each participating community receives an equal share of 
the quantity of the good being produced (1/2 share in this case).  Thus, the graph reads 
that a community places the same value on independent or own production as equated to 
joint production where it shares in half of the output of the public good. 4
With this initial setup, we can examine the implications of various decision rules 
regarding cost allocation in intergovernmental agreements.  For this first model, the 
quantity-price conditions are established by a benevolent social planner who equates 
marginal social costs and marginal social benefits as a decision rule.  This would equate 
to point Qj in figure 2.    Under the assumption of equal quantity (implying separate 
 
4 The quantity axis should be interpreted as a two unit bundle of the good being produced.  Each 
community receives a ½ share of that two unit bundle (1 unit).  The demand curves differ, one being higher 
than the other due to the fact that one community’s income, and therefore demand for the good, is higher.  
In other words, one community places a greater value on their share of the two unit bundle than the other 
community.  
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communities cannot adjust their own consumption), neither party receives the amount of 
good they would want through independent provision. If the units agree to produce that 
amount through joint provision, there is a welfare loss to both parties.  Community X 
consumes more than they would prefer resulting in welfare loss ABC and community Y 
consumes less than they would prefer as welfare loss depicted by the triangle CDE in  
Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Welfare Loss from Joint Production versus Independent Production 
 
These welfare losses help explain the difficulty of negotiating intergovernmental 
agreements, particularly where the level of service provision must be provided in lumpy 
form (or more uniform provision).  Figure 2 does not indicate any type of cost savings 
from joint provision.  The joint cost (2P) is simply double that of the individual cost (P).  
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Under these conditions, there is no incentive for either community to participate in a joint 
venture with no cost savings and uniform provision of service. 
 
Cost Savings Model 
Let us introduce cost savings into the model.  Cost savings are assumed to occur 
due to the presence of economies of scale or volume in the operation of given 
government enterprise or activity.  Cost savings, based on the assumption of price taking 
behavior, increases the optimal quantity associated with the joint or total demand curve5.
Joint provision by local governments may result in cost savings.  These cost savings can 
be reflected in the graph by a movement in the price line. Imagine that joint provision of 
services results in a marginal cost reduction of (P – R) (R being the cost savings). The 
cost savings for joint provision is represented by the new price line 2P – R in figure 3.  
Furthermore, this cost savings is often considered at the basis of the rationale for 
undertaking interlocal agreements.  The cost savings effect shifts the optimal provision of 
the public good from Qj to Qj’.  
The total benefit of the cost savings is defined by the triangle IJKL.  As a joint 
provision agreement is negotiated, a typical sticking point is the allocation of cost share 
and cost savings among participants.  The triangle IJKL represents the total savings that 
can be spread across governmental participants.  This cost savings or benefit of joint 
provision will obviously be weighed against the costs, specifically in terms of the welfare 
loss (loss of autonomy over the level of service to be provided) associated with the 
distance between joint and independent provision and citizen preferences.  
 
5 The optimal quantity rises because the cost savings translate into more available resources which raises 
the demand for the service.  To some extent, these additional resources due to cost savings may also be 
spent on other goods and services in the community. 
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One solution is to simply let the units undertake independent provision.  Of course 
with the assumption of cost savings introduced, the two governments would be giving up 
on the benefits associated with the shape IJKL.  These cost savings are often cited as the 
reason for pursuing intergovernmental cooperation (ACIR, 1985).  There are several 
solutions that the governments could pursue to achieve these benefits and minimize the 
costs associated with cooperation via welfare loss. 
 
Figure 3: Impact of Cost Savings on Welfare Outcomes  
 
These aggregate benefits (cost savings) must be distributed across participating 
governmental units.  The distribution of these benefits is critical to the success or failure 
to achieve any type of agreement related to service cooperation.  There are several 
schemes one can imagine to distribute the benefits of costs savings.  One scheme would 
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be a flat rate price paid by each entity.  Another scheme would be a marginal pricing 
strategy where each entity is charged a price based on their demand for the good or 
service.  A variation of marginal cost pricing, which could occur depending on the 
bargaining nature between the government entities, would be a quasi marginal cost 
pricing scheme where different entities may receive greater or fewer benefits.  A final 
scheme would be, rather than focusing on price adjustments, to allow for quantity 
adjustments by having some level of joint provision and independent provision above a 
certain level for high demand communities. 
 
Equal Cost Sharing Scenario 
The first scenario to envision is one where the cost allocation or pricing for joint 
provision is bore at an equal level by both governmental units.  For community X, this 
new price line indicates that their welfare loss will actually increase by the amount AHG.  
This is because they have moved farther way from their optimal independent provision 
point.  For community Y, the high demand community, the cost savings shift results in a 
potentially reduced level of welfare loss (compare triangle CDE to DFG).  Again, this 
result depends on the slope of the demand curves.  Community X, the lower demand 
community, may suffer an even greater loss in welfare due to being pushed farther away 
from their optimal community demand for the government service.   A more inelastic 
curve, where demand is less responsive to change in price, will lead to potentially a 
smaller welfare loss. 
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Figure Four: Equal Cost Sharing Scenario 
 
Quantity Adjustment Scenario 
One solution is to allow for both joint provision and independent provision.  This 
quantity adjustment technique assumes that the public good is only “public” within the 
government entity and not between entities (i.e. no interjurisdictional spillovers).  The 
joint provision occurs to the point where the lower price line intersects the lowest 
community demand curve (in figure 3 point B; community X).  At that level of service 
provision, community Y in figure 3 still demands a higher quantity.  This can be 
accomplished by the community Y purchasing via self production.  The low demand 
community, community X in figure 3, will gain by being able to purchase their ideal 
community demand level at a lower price.  This results in a welfare gain of figure ABST.  
Community Y, the high demand community, does gain by being able to secure a certain 
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level of services at a lower price; it is then able to self produce at a higher cost rate and 
achieve its optimally desired level of services.   This self production could be 
accomplished through private contracting or public production.  Community Y would self 
produce the quantity from Qj to Qy along price line P.  Under this framework, community 
X captures the benefits of joint production, while community Y remains indifferent at the 
margin.  This distribution of benefits may be major factor in negotiations between 
communities who must still incur the upfront transaction and communication costs. 
 
Figure Five: Quantity Adjustment Scenario 
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Marginal cost Sharing Scenario 
Another scheme is defined by charging different tax prices or cost shares for the 
public good to each community.  For convenience, these cost shares will be allocated 
based on the intersection of the each community’s demand curve with the optimal joint 
provision line drawn from the total demand curve to point Qj’.  Thus, for community X, 
the point M represents the optimal provision under differential pricing.  The community 
is in equilibrium but in fact a welfare loss still exists. For community Y, the optimal point 
under differential pricing is much higher due to greater demand. 
 
Figure 6: Impact of Marginal cost Sharing on Welfare Outcomes 
 
Under this scheme, the price charged to each community would be at points M 
(for community X) and N (for community Y) in figure 6.  With marginal cost pricing, 
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community X would gain surplus relative to their situation under independent production 
by the area AMBD.  Community Y would lose surplus (area DCNE) because they would 
be paying a higher price that under independent production.  In this situation, it would not 
make sense for community Y to agree to such a cooperative venture.  However, 
community X could offer community Y a side payment leading to a sustainable 
cooperative agreement.  Community X would have to benefit enough from the joint 
provision arrangement to be able to offer a side payment and still retain some surplus.  
The side payment would need to be enough to make community Y indifferent between 
independent and joint production and still community X better off. 
There is a final possible scheme involving a variation of marginal cost pricing.  
Different governmental units may be able, via bargaining be able to attain a lower level 
of cost share of price for services relative to other governmental units.  Of course, other 
units will have to pay higher prices or cost shares in order to make up the difference and 
cover total expenditures.  Based on the logic of this model, the gains of efficiency from 
cost sharing with regards to a joint service provision must be drawn from the surplus of 
taxes paid over service costs by the high demand communities.  This redistribution of 
resources can only occur to a certain point; above that point the high demand community, 
such as community Y will exit the cooperative arrangement and self produce the service.  
This exist strategy will reduce the services available to the low demand community. 
One can envision many scenarios under this variation of marginal cost pricing.  
Depending on the nature of two parties bargaining strengths, in one scenario, the lower 
demand communities can extract surplus from the high demand community.  The limit of 
this transfer can be expressed in the diagram as the point where the gains in joint 
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provision efficiency exceed the costs in lost welfare due to transfers of cost sharing to 
low demand communities and the loss of welfare due to uniform provision requirements.   
 
Proposed Research Hypotheses 
This analysis leads to proposed hypotheses related to intergovernmental 
cooperation of uniform service provision.  The first hypothesis is that the closer are two 
or more communities demand curves, with a particular focus on average income 
differences between communities, the more likely they are to cooperate.  The degree of 
closeness reduces the welfare loss from uniform provision.  Thus, even a smaller amount 
of cost savings will likely be greater than the amount of welfare loss from uniform 
provision.  Nonuniform provision is particularly difficult due to the transaction costs that 
must be incurred by the negotiating parties in seeking agreement on the provision of 
service levels and the sharing of cost savings. 
The second hypothesis is that the elasticity of demand for services will potentially 
have an impact on the relationship between cost savings and demand preferences.  
Communities with strong preferences for a good or service and price inelastic demands 
will likely lose more welfare relative to communities with elastic demand, perhaps due to 
more choices or substitute options.  If the communities have nearly identical preferences, 
the gap between the two or more demand curves will remain the same and not affect the 
results associated with the uniform provision of service levels. 
One important hypothesis that cannot be addressed is which adjustment scheme 
(equal share, marginal cost or quantity adjustment) are more likely to emerge under 
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different conditions.  This important question will be left to extensions of this model or 
further developments with other types of approaches. 
 
Conclusion 
 The use of interlocal or intergovernmental agreements, while first described in the 
1960’s, has become a major tool for achieving economic and service efficiency in local 
government affairs.  This model has attempted to depict the simple welfare economics of 
joint production of a public good by two or more local governments.  This form of 
interlocal agreement has become important as existing jurisdictional boundaries do not 
make sense in economic, political, or social terms as communities undergo change.  This 
model has only depicted one particular form of interlocal agreement among a wide 
spectrum of choices. 
 The results indicate that each potential cost allocation formula has distributional 
consequences on various local government partners.  Primarily, equal cost sharing, as one 
would expect, benefits the low demand or usage community relative to the high demand 
community.  This economic impact must be weighed against the costs of data collection 
and monitoring to determine to assess if a different system would be warranted. 
 A usage or marginal cost system clearly provides more benefits to the higher 
usage community.  However, even in this case, the low demand community can attempt, 
through negotiations to extract some net benefits for itself at the expense of the high 
demand community.  The actual results of such a negotiation would depend on the skills 
and information that each party had access to.   In this case, transaction costs would be 
incurred to ensure the measurement of the critical usage variables which could be factors 
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such as water usage, fire and ambulance runs and crime statistics.  In either case, the 
benefits of marginal cost allocation would be weighed against these transaction costs. 
Communities must carefully assess the tradeoffs involved in any cost allocation 
when entering into an intergovernmental agreement requiring such a provision.  Different 
allocation schemes will have different impacts on community welfare and will influence 
the likelihood of being able to come to an agreement.  Future extensions of this type of 
approach must include other choices such as consolidation and annexation.  These 
choices entail different benefits and costs than a formal agreement to deliver services 
jointly, but where other specific services are still provided independently.  Another 
extension would be the economics of interlocal agreements in the face on 
interjurisdictional externalities or spillovers.  These types of spillovers are likely to 
change the calculus of agreement.  Finally, the results should be generalized to a set of 
local governments beyond two. 
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